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Scope:
Most Popular Contact-less Smart Cards
• Building Access Control
• Public Transportation
• and Other Small Payments
Their Security: Focus on Card Cloning
• Which cards are more/less secure
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Philosophy
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Security of Smart Cards 
[Schneier and Schostack 1999 paper] 
• splitting the security perimeter
• hardware barriers that cannot be breached by software,
• physical control of the card by the user,
• and trusting the entities involved in developing components 
of a secure system
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RFID
This model somewhat breaks apart
with RFID smart cards…
RFID => no user control.
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Secrecy
The secrecy of the product spec is:
• not an extra security layer, 
• but a source of unexpected 
and critical security vulnerabilities 
– that by the fact of being hidden 
give an utterly false sense of security
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Contact-less Smart Card
• with RF transceiver
• 0.1 s transaction
– less energy
– less computing power
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Building Transport and Small Payments
Malaysia
(MiFare Classic !)
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Transport Card Systems
Main Standards:
• Calypso 
[France, Belgium]
• MiFare
[UK, Holland, 
Etc..]
• Other standards exist. 
In Asia: Sony Felica
[Japan,India,HongKong
,etc..]
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Building Cards
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Supply Chain Control and Segmentation
supply chain control: it is hard for criminals to get these 
systems for reverse engineering…
segmentation = additional security perimeter splits: 
• In some systems a smart card used in one company 
CANNOT be re-programmed to work in another 
building.
But…
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… However
Problem: Companies have little choice.
• If they are price sensitive they will be sold insecure systems.
• If they aren’t they are still NOT sure that systems are secure, 
• because the market is not very competitive and security is taboo: 
you are expected to trust the supplier.
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Our UK SURVEY 
2012 
Building Cards (only)
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Survey [2012]
2012. 
Survey conducted among 
400 UK companies.
Some 20 has responded
to our questionnaire.
Sensitive questions, collected anonymously.
Details: 
Master Thesis by Ayoade Adebanke, 
M.Sc. Information Security, 
University College London, September 2012
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Key Findings
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Smart Cards Are Popular in the UK
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What Do We Need These Systems For?
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Not Know / Not Care / Obscure Reseller Brand
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Security in Place
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Cards + Extra Security
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Card + PIN?
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Biometrics
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Building/ID Cards
Security, Cloning, Etc..
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Building Cards – 2 Types
• RFID cards: Broadcast unique serial number
• More advanced cards with cryptography.
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Building Cards – 2 Types
• RFID cards: Unique serial
– Proprietary encoding of transmission
• Initially hard to imitate 
– but eventually decoded recorded and replayed perfectly
• Cards with cryptography.
– Mutual Authenticationt l t ti ti
– Encrypted Communicationst  i ti
– Tamper resistance: for data and cryptography. i t : f  t   t .
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Wiegand Interface
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26-Bit Wiegand Format 
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Cryptographic Cards
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Building Cards – 2 Types
• RFID cards: Unique serial
– Proprietary encoding of transmissioni t  i  f t i i
• Initially hard to imitate I iti ll   t  i it t  
– but eventually decoded recorded and replayed perfectlyt t ll   r r   r l  rf tl
• Cards with cryptography.
– Mutual Authentication
– Encrypted Communications
– Tamper resistance: for data and cryptography.
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Wiegand “Loophole”
All data are NOT transmitted to the 
controller or the back-end system!
may be
secure..
cannot be
very
secure!
26 bits
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Contact-less Authentication - History
IFF: Identify Friend or Foe (1942)
Challenge-
-Response
problem: relay attacksl l
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Hidden Cryptography!
Normal high-level access to data on the card.
Confidential crypto algorithm is implemented inside the reader, 
the developer will totally ignore it and may think that the security is 
very high, or very low, there is no way to tell!
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Main “Crypto” Cards
MiFare Classic: 
• >1 billion of these cards sold!
• 70 % of the contactless badge/ticketing market
• Oyster cards [all cards issued before 2010], 
UK Cabinet office, Cambridge uni, etc…
More recent Oyster cards [2010-now] are 
MiFare DesFire, 
• No cryptographic attack yet, broken only by side channel 
attacks [cost: few thousands of dollars per card].
• No working card simulator on hacker market yet.
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HID iClass
<> HID Prox: unique serial nb. no other security
HID iClass
Almost serious crypto 
with DES and 3DES 
but keys have been 
”obtained” by reader firmware 
hacking methods [Meriac 2011]
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Clone Attacks
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Cloning the Card
Is it feasible to 
re-program the card itself?
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Clone Oyster Card?
All card emitted before 2010 were 
MiFare Classic 1K 
BUT,
not so easy:
No blank cards on the market in which one 
can change the serial number.
?
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Unique ID
MiFare Classic in sector 0.
Cannot be changed, not even 
by the manufacturer.
The only security in 
many building systems…
[Cambridge, 
Imperial, UCL, etc.]
Attack: 
card simulation
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Cloning the Card
Is it feasible to
re-program the card itself?
Sometimes it is!
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Example 1:
HID Prox [1991-today]
• unique serial + proprietary encoding
no other security
Can be reprogrammed into another 
white card or tag, 
–T5667R/W or Q5 are widely available.
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Example 2:
HID iClass [2002-today]
• Crypto cards
– Mutual Authentication
– Encryption of Data
problem: reader firmware update 
procedure is insecure [Meriac 2010] 
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Hacking iClass Readers [2010]
Steps:
1. Get just one genuine reader like RW400 [100 GBP].
• standard security: any reader!
• high security version: 
• the same but the hacker needs to get hold of a reader from the same building
• we were able to get one easily
2. Produce a custom debugging interface.
• make a non-standard connector
• build a non-standard firmware programmer
3. Execute 2 separate software exploits (half way between a boot virus 
and a Trojan) to dump a) the boot block b) the main program c) the 
EEPROM
4. The code contains 3DES keys in cleartext.
5. These keys are already in possession of German hackers since 
December 2010, cf. Milosh Meriac, CCC 2010 paper.
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Hacking iClass Readers [Dec 2010]
3DES Key!
• read and write any card. We NEED ONLY:
a standard publicly available reader [80 GBP] 
+ free software provided by the manufacturer.
• only blocks 2,5 and 9 need to copied…
• this will NOT change the serial number BUT…
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Imperfect Clone Works !?!
•copy data blocks 5 and 9
•can be copied to ANOTHER ordinary card
•this will NOT change the serial number BUT…
•many door readers do NOT transmit the serial 
number!!! So the cloned card works!
•card simulator not needed…
Crypto: 
•derive key
•authenticate
•read
data
26 bits
•different SN
•different key
•same data
Building and Transport Cards Security
Courtois Hulme Gupta, Chip to Cloud 2012 45
What Makes
Cloning Harder?
and how to get around it
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Anti-Cloning Functionality?
• RFID cards: Unique serial
– in hardware, 
• Crypto cards
– Mutual Authentication
– Encryption of Data
Secure crypto 
implementation
extract keys?
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Crime Scripts – Cloning  [1]
• RFID cards: Unique serial
– in hardware, CANNOT be changed
use a 
card simulator
record and 
decode
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Crime Scripts – Cloning [2]
• RFID cards
–
• Crypto cards:
extract keys! simulateread the data
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Defence in Depth Principle
Learn from the Military: 
layer the defences.
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Defenses of the Card
Fraud
user control
spec secrecy
authenticate terminal
PIN check/user auth.
crypto implementation
Crime 
Script
supply chain control
application rev. eng.
get data / access
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MiFare Classic Crypto-1
Stream cipher used in about 200 million RFID chips 
worldwide.
• Ticketing 
(e.g. London’s 
Underground). 
• Access to high-security 
buildings
• Etc.
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Again: Not Like This
Cryptography is invisible
=> Cannot be broken like this.
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Low Level Access
==
Commands sent over the air.
These boards + software work 
and are widely available:
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C++  + nfclib +  ACR122
Example:
> 26
< 0400
> 9320
< CA1C46D141
> 9370CA1C46D141 (CRC)
< 08 (CRC)
> 6000(CRC)
< 24D2783A
> CF80E99F1AA2A1F1
> …
UID
Building and Transport Cards Security
Courtois Hulme Gupta, Chip to Cloud 2012 55
Reverse-Engineering [Nohl et al.]
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Waste of Silicon
Internal bits are computed 2-3 times.
One could save half of the gates!
Terrible weakness: 
super-strong self-similarity.
A monkey typing at random 
would have designed a more secure cipher..
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Easy To Break?
• 0.05 seconds. 
[de Koning Gans  et al, Esorics 2008]
Requires recorded communications 
with a genuine reader.
• The hacker must already penetrate 
into the building. 
• Small window of opportunity.
• CCTV, monitoring… etc…
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Moreover: It is Illegal
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
RIPA [2000].
[…] “It shall be an offence for a person 
intentionally and without lawful authority 
to intercept, 
at any place in the United Kingdom, 
any communication
in the course of its transmission “ […]
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In Contrast:
Reading somebody’s card is 
NOT explicitly illegal 
[except in some US states, 
new laws]
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Card-Only Attacks
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Card-Only Attacks
The real security question is:
Can I copy it, when I am sitting 
near the cardholder for a few 
minutes in the underground 
(contactless card queries).
Yes!
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Card-Only Attacks
Danger is 24h/24:
Anybody that is sitting/standing 
next to you can steal your 
identity (or at least enter some 
very nice building…)
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Card-Only Attacks Infeasible?
Yes, due to the protocol.
Sound engineering principle:
The card never ever answers anything related 
to the secret data, unless the reader sends 
a valid cryptogram on 8 bytes…
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Card-Only Attacks: 
Infeasible => Possible?
or how MiFare Classic was broken anyway
[4 Attacks by Dutch Nijmegen group 
+ the ‘Dark Side Attack’ by Courtois, 2009]
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A Bug in MiFare Classic
Discovered accidentally. 
• sometimes, under certain conditions, the card
outputs a mysterious 4 bits…
• given the fact that many RFID readers are not 
100 % reliable, it is easy to overlook it
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The Bug?
Or maybe a backdoor?
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Secure Product Development
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Secure Hardware Dev. Management
[In smart cards] one design criterion differs from the criteria used for 
standard chips but is nonetheless very important is that 
absolutely no undocumented mechanisms or functions must be 
present in the chip ('that's note a bug, that's a feature'). 
Since they are not documented, they can be unintentionally 
overlooked during the hardware evaluation and possibly be used 
later for attacks. 
The use of such undocumented features is thus strictly prohibited [...] 
[pages 518-519 in the Smart Card handbook 
by Wolfgang Rankl and Wolfgang Effing, 
1088 pages, Wiley, absolute reference in the industry]
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The “Bug” was known…
Courtois was the first to circulate a paper that 
describes this vulnerability in March 2009.
But in fact many researchers knew about it 
already…
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Crime Scripts – Cloning [2]
• RFID cards
–
• Crypto cards:
extract keys! simulateread the data
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More Details:
Slides about MiFare Classic
www.nicolascourtois.com/papers/mifare_all.pdf
Full paper: SECRYPT 2009, see also eprint.iacr.org/2009/137/
Hack it at home: 
step by step instructions:
http://www.nicolascourtois.com/MifareClassicHack.pdf
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Embarrassing Discoveries
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Strange Weaker Cards
Example: card used in Kiev, Ukraine underground 
[hosting Euro 2012]. 
• Unlicensed illegal clones of MiFare Classic. 
– nobody expected that there will ever be a HIDDEN 
method to distinguish?
• normal functionality is identical
– careful examination shows that they are Fudan
Microelectronics FM11RF08 from Shanghai, China.
• This card will ALWAYS answer the spoof attempt. Easier to 
clone…
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More Strange Clones
There are other clones. Come from India, China and Russia 
(!). http://www.proxmark.org/forum/topic/169/mifare-
classic-clones/
Remark: People/companies in Russia China and India 
• did not advertise their hacking exploits, 
• did NOT publish a nice paper at CARDIS 
or CHIP TO CLOUD conference…
• They just made clones…
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Combined Attacks
(ours + Nijmegen)
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Best Attack in Practice
Use ‘Courtois Dark Side’ attack for one sector.
Then use Nested Authentication attack 
[Nijmegen Oakland paper] for other sectors.
Google for MFCUK and MFOC software…
[provided by Costin and Nethemba]
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Case Study: Oyster Cards vs. 
Warsaw Poland Metro/Bus/Parking Card
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Important Principle:
Making cards much harder to 
attack: 
Diversify all keys for each card
• Done for every Oyster card
• Not done in many other 
countries, examples: 
– In Kiev, Ukraine, the first block 
uses the default Infineon key 
A0A1A2A3A4A5
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Hall of Shame (1)
• In Warsaw, Poland, the first block 
uses the default Philips key 
FFFFFFFFFFFF, 
• Then keys are THE SAME in every 
card
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Hall of Shame (contd.)
• In Warsaw, Poland, the first block 
uses the default Philips key 
FFFFFFFFFFFF, 
• Then keys are THE SAME in every 
card
• Moreover keys are NOT random, but 
human-generated.
– for example many start with 898989, 
some end with 898989…
• obsession with history? 
– in 1989 they had first “free” elections…
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Conclusion
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Anti-Cloning
• unique hardware serial number 
+
• strong cryptography
are the main anti-cloning defences 
in today’s contact-less smart cards 
used in buildings, 
public transportation 
and for small payments.
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Key Management
With the same card
[MiFare Classic, badly broken] 
the security can still be 
• quite good [London], or 
• very bad [Warsaw]: 
Break once => clone any card without 
special equipment
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Key Management is Hard
Break the reader once 
=> clone any card without special 
equipment…
• Works for HID iClass 
[Meriac 2011]
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Help
Most of current cards 
have serious security flaws and need upgrades.
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Explosion of hacker attacks:
2008-2012… Most cards are broken…
Cloning equipment is not hard to get…
[Proxmark3 etc]
Did anybody notice? 
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Back to Our UK SURVEY 2012 
Building Cards (only)
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Afraid?Threat?Upgrade?
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Card Cloning Specifically
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Spectacularly Naïve
Customers are spectacularly naïve 
about the security of current systems.
